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NOTES
were not legally collectible amounted to an allegation that the
error related to a material part of the contract. She had there-
fore stated a cause of action for rescission on the ground of error
induced by fraud.
The defendants also contended that plaintiff's petition did
not state a cause of action because the alleged misrepresentation
was not contained in the formal act of sale. That contention, as
recognized by the court, was based on the premise that plaintiff
would be unable to prove the charges in her petition because
parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict or vary the recitals
of the act. The court rightly dismissed this contention on the
well settled ground that the parol evidence rule is inapplicable
where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff alleges fraud bearing
on a material fact, or error relating to the principal cause.20
The decision, it is submitted, is in keeping with the estab-
lished principles of civil law.
John S. Covington
SALES-SCOPE OF PUBLIC RECORDS DOCTRINE--
SUCCESSION JUDGMENTS
By authentic act plaintiff bought certain land from Richard
Raney in 1948. Raney had purchased the property during his
marriage to Belle Fraser Raney, and upon her death the property
was adjudicated to him by the court. In the succession proceed-
ing, Raney had represented to the court that Belle Fraser Raney
died intestate and left no ascendants, descendants, or adopted
children. In 1950 the defendants in the instant case instituted
proceedings alleging that they were the children and sole heirs
at law of the decedent, and should therefore be put in possession
of Belle Raney's one-half interest in the community property.
The court sent them into possession of the decedent's one-half
interest in the realty.
20. Broussard v. Sudrique, 4 La. 347 (1832); Brownson v. Fenwick, 19 La.
431 (1841); Bell v. Western M. & F. Ins. Co., 5 Rob. 423, 39 Am. Dec. 542 (La.
1843); Bauduc v. Conrey, 10 Rob. 466 (La. 1845); Jamison v. Ludlow, 3 La.
Ann. 492 (1847); Morris v. Terrenoire, 2 La. Ann. 458 (1847); Cox v. King, 20
La. Ann. 209 (1868); LeBleu v. Savoie, 109 La. 680, 33 So. 729 (1930); Great
Eastern Oil & Ref. Co. v. Bullock, 151 La. 209, 91 So. 680 (1922). See also
Baker v. Baker, 209 La. 1041, 26 So. 2d 132 (1946); Pike v. Kentwood Bank,
146 La. 704, 83 So. 904 (1919). Generally see Comment, 3 LojUIANA LAW
REVIEW 427 (1941),
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In the instant case the plaintiff, Riley Allen, sought to have
himself judicially declared the owner of and entitled to the
undisturbed possession of the land which was occupied by the
defendants. Plaintiff relied on his acquisition from Raney and
the judgment giving the latter possession of his wife's one-half
interest in the community property. Held, that on the death of
Belle Fraser Raney, the only interest in the property which
Richard Raney had was his community share, and he could con-
vey and transmit no more than that to his vendee, Riley Allen,
plaintiff. The wife's share was the property of the defendants,
her forced heirs. Allen v. Anderson, 55 So. 2d 596 (La. 1951).
No reference was made by the court to the fact that when
Allen bought the property, he relied on the judgment giving
possession to Raney. Since court judgments are as a matter of
course entered in the public records, the question arises as to the
relation of this decision to the McDuffie v. Walker rule that pur-
chasers of immovable property may rely on the public records.'
The McDufie rule, predicated on Article 2266 of the Louisiana
Civil Code, is well established in Louisiana jurisprudence.2 This
famous case permanently settled the rule that unrecorded con-
tractual rights are null and void as to third parties relying on
the public records. The third party purchaser, then, is not bound
by any secret equities between the vendor and other persons if
he has purchased the property in reliance on public records
which declare that the title to the property rests with the vendor.3
In fact, under the McDufile rule even actual knowledge of an
unrecorded title is not equivalent to knowledge or notice result-
ing from recordation of the act transferring title.
The McDuffie rule is so well known that one is likely to
overlook the instances where a purchaser of immovable property
is not allowed to rely on the public records. In the Succession
of James a wife bought and mortgaged property during the mar-
riage, listing herself in both transactions as a single woman. It
was held that third party purchasers (after foreclosure) could
1. 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909).
2. "All sales, contracts and judgments, affecting immovable property,
which shall not be so recorded, shall be utterly null and void, except between
the parties thereto. The recording may be made at any time, but shall only
affect third persons from the time of the iecording.
"The recording shall have effect from the time when the act is deposited
in the proper office, and indorsed by the proper officer." Art. 2266, La. Civil
Code of 1870.
3. Adam v. Brownell-Drews Lumer Co., 115 La. 179, 38 So. 957 (1905).
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not, by relying on those recorded transactions wherein the wife
had listed herself as single, defeat the husband's right to a one-
half interest in the property. The court declared that the pro-
tection of the right of a surviving spouse to an undivided one-
half interest in the community property operates as an exception
to the rule that third parties may rely on the public records. 4 The
husband's rights in the community, being vested by law, did not
require recordation in order to be effective against third parties.
In Humphreys v. Royal5 a husband bought property during
the marriage and stated in the act of sale that he was a single
man. Subsequently he obtained a divorce which was not recorded;
and then sold the property, again declaring that he was a single
man. The court held that the unrecorded divorce judgment in
controversy was utterly null as to the defendant, a third party
purchaser relying on the public records. This case is not con-
trary to the Succession of James. Whereas the wife in the James
case had no power to defeat her spouse's vested interest in the
community property, the husband in the Humphreys case did
have such power, and as far as third parties were concerned
recordation of the judgment of divorce, like recordation of a
prior sale, was necessary to destroy that power. Article 2266 of
the Louisiana Civil Code requires recordation for final judg-
ments as it does for contracts affecting immovable property.
Long v. Chailan70 presented another situation which could not
be included within the scope of the general rule. The court there
held that the doctrine of McDuffle v. Walker does not defeat the
rights of forced heirs who inherit their mother's half of com-
munity property, even though there is no positive information on
the public records as to their inheritance rights. The rights of
the forced heirs as that of the husband in the James case were
vested by law and thus did not require recordation to be effective
against third parties.
Subsequent to this case, Chachere v. Superior Oil Company7
reaffirmed the McDuffle case when the court refused to admit
evidence by forced heirs tending to vary the public records after
the property had passed into the hands of third parties. Long v.
4. 147 La. 944, 86 So. 403 (1920).
5. 215 La. 567, 41 So. 2d 220 (1949), noted in 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 389
(1951).
6. 187 La. 507, 175 So. 42 (1937).
7. 192 La. 193, 187 So. 321 (1939), noted in 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 387
(1940),
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Chailan is not overruled by this decision because the cases may
be distinguished on their facts. In the Long case the father had
acquired the property during the marriage and it was therefore
community property. Upon dissolution of the community by the
mother's death, the husband's vested power to administer com-
munity property ended, and the heirs became vested by law with
their inherited one-half interest in the community. Since the
father then had no power to transfer title to the property belong-
ing to his children, title did not pass to the third party purchaser
when a seizing creditor had the property sold at a judicial sale
to satisfy a personal debt of the father. On the other hand, in the
Chachere case the father had purchased the property after the
dissolution of the community. Because a spouse has power to
dispose of property acquired after dissolution of the community
the third party purchasing from the father could acquire title
even though the father had purchased the land with community
funds, since there was nothing on the public records to put the
third party purchaser on notice that the property had been so
purchased.
In Thompson v. Thompson" it was held that the right of a
third party relying on the public records to enforce a contract
to sell did not supersede the right of the forced heirs to claim
collation. In affirmation of the Chachere case the court agreed
that if the third party purchaser had secured title by an act of
sale he would have been protected against the unrecorded rights
of forced heirs who would not have been allowed to annul the
simulated sale of their ancestor. In the Thompson case, as in the
Chachere case, the husband had the power to sell, for the com-
munity was still in existence when the husband purportedly sold
the land to his son Jesse. The fact that the deed from husband to
son was a donation in disguise prevented title from vesting in
the son and upon the death of the father the land, not having
been transferred by the son, returned fictitiously to, the succession
by virtue of Article 1505 of the Louisiana Civil Code." It should
be noted that the court did not rely upon Article 22391o in reach-
8. 211 La. 468, 30 So. 2d 321 (1947), noted in 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 429
(1947), 22 Tulane L. Rev. 208 (1947).
9. "To determine the reduction to which the donations, either inter vivos
or mortis causa are liable, an aggregate is formed of all the property belong-
ing to the donor or testator at the time of his decease; to that is fictitiously
added the property disposed of by donation inter vivos, according to its
value. . . ." Art. 1505, La. Civil Code of 1870.
10. "Counter letters can have no effect against creditors or bona fide
purchasers; they are valid as to all others; but forced heirs shall have the
.514 [VOL. XlI
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ing its decision, although the right of the heirs to have the sale
made by their father set aside as a simulation came into existence
under this article long before the vendee of the simulated sale
promised to sell the land to the third party. This right could not
affect the subsequently acquired right of the third party to a
specific performance of his contract, because the third party was
without knowledge of the right of the heirs under Article 2239
and there was nothing on the public records to advise him of
its existence.
The instant case presents another situation where the rule
of the McDuffie case does not apply, that is, where the third party
relies upon a succession judgment giving his vendor possession
of the property. But the fact that succession judgments are not
final was expounded long before the McDuffie rule and therefore
are not included under Article 2266 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
As early as 1841 the Supreme Court of Louisiana declared that
recognition of some heirs does not preclude other heirs appearing
afterwards from showing that they are in fact heirs. 1 Such an
opinion necessarily implies that third party purchasers cannot
safely rely on succession judgments, and thus justifies the action
of the court in the present case.12 A succession judgment is con-
sidered as only ex parte, and although it is prima facie evidence
of the fact of heirship, it gives only possession, not ownership.1 3
An heir is able to transfer title only to his own interest in the
succession and not the whole even though he is given possession
of it by a decree of the court.
Allen v. Anderson, therefore, is by no means a new or out-
standing pronouncement by a Louisiana court, but it recognizes
the rule that the unrecorded rights of forced heirs may in certain
situations be asserted against third parties relying on public
records, and incorporates into it the old civil law theory that
succession judgments are not final as long as there are other
heirs who may assert valid claims to the estate, even though the
same right to annul absolutely and by parol evidence the simulated contracts
of those from whom they inherit, and shall not be restricted to the legitimate
[legitime]." Art. 2239, La. Civil Code of 1870.
11. Glover v. Doty, 1 Rob. 130 (La. 1841).
12. This does not seem to be the rule where a third party purchaser
relies on a judgment giving a tutor permission to sell. A tutor is able to
transfer title to the purchaser by virtue of a judicial order. Pike v. Monget,
4 La. Ann. 227 (1849).
13. Chamberlain v. City of New Orleans, 48 La. Ann. 1055, 20 So. 169
(1896); Dixon V, omrmercial Nationa Bank, 13 La. App. 204, 127 So 42
(1930),
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property has been transferred into the hands of a good faith
third party purchaser who has relied on the public records.
Helen M. Wimmer
SECURITY DEVICES-PERSONAL LIABILITY OF THIRD PARTY
PURCHASERS UNDER REVISED STATUTES 9:5362
The Harris Finance Company brought action against Fridge
to recover the balance of the purchase price of an automobile
which was secured by a chattel mortgage. Fridge purchased the
car from the mortgagor and was being sued under the provisions
of Title 9, Section 5362, of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. This
statute states: "It shall be unlawful for a resident of any parish
to purchase the movable property described in R.S. 9:5351 from
any non-resident of such parish, without first obtaining an affi-
davit from the non-resident that there is no mortgage on the
property, nor any money due on the purchase price thereof, and
the purchaser who shall buy the movable property without
having obtained the affidavit, shall be personally liable to the
creditor for the debt secured by the property." Defendant Fridge
failed to get the affidavit required by the statute. Harris Finance
Company had failed to record the mortgage. Because of this fact
Fridge was a purchaser without notice, and the question was
whether the provisions of the statute applied to him. Held, Fridge
was personally liable to the Harris Finance Company on the
basis of the statute. Harris Finance Company v. Fridge, 55 So.
2d 707 (La. 1951).
The particular section in question was originally enacted as
Section 5 of Act 151 of 1916. It was included as Section 5 of Act
198 of 1918 and Section 8 of Act 172 of 1944. It was then written
verbatim into the Revised Statutes of 1950. The court of appeal
said in Finance Security Company v. Williams' that although
the mortgage in that case could not affect third persons because
it was invalid, "the liability herein sought to be imposed on them
does not arise out of the act of mortgage itself. Their liability,
if any, is purely statutory and came into existence by virtue of
the provisions of Section 8 of Act 172 of 1944." 2 In the Harris
1. 42 So. 2d 310 (La. App. 1949), rehearing refused 42 So. 2d 901 (La. App.
1949).
2. 42 So. 2d 310, 313.
[VOL. XII
